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We study the emergence of conventions in dynamic networks experimentally. Conventions are modeled
in terms of coordination games in which actors can choose both their behavior and their interaction part-
ners. We study how macro-level outcomes of the process in terms of Pareto-efﬁciency and heterogeneity
depend on initial conditions. Moreover, we examine the underlying processes at the microlevel. Predic-
tions are derived from a game-theoreticmodel which is applied to our experimental conditions bymeans
of computer simulation. The results provide mixed support for the macro-level hypotheses, and indicate
rovepossible directions to imp
. Introduction
In many social and economic interactions, people have an inter-
st in aligning their behaviorswith one another.We speak the same
anguage tocommunicate,weagree to the sametrafﬁc rules inorder
o drive safely, andwhenwriting an article together, it helps if com-
uter programs are compatible. In economic interactions, if trade
akes place in the marketplace, traders must at least manage to
eet at the same time and place. In a more abstract sense, coor-
ination problems are central to the problem of social order and
he emergence of institutions (see Hume [1739–40], 1978; Hardin,
007). For instance, Hobbes’ Leviathan presupposes that citizens
oordinate on a leader to solve the problem of social order.
This paper is concerned with the situations in which coordina-
ion is problematic. It studies the role of social networks in how
ctors handle coordination problems if the social network can be
hanged by the actors and co-evolves with the actors’ behavior in
oordination problems. Moreover, we study the effects of infor-
ation availability in these networks on coordination. We use a
aboratory experiment in which subjects play coordination games
hile choosing interaction partners. In this experiment, we test
ypotheses derived from a game-theoretic model reﬂecting the
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experiment.Weapply analyticalmethods and computer simulation
to derive our hypotheses.
1.1. Coordination, conventions, and networks
Often, coordination problems are resolved by conventions, i.e.,
behavioral patterns that aremutually expected and self-reinforcing
(Lewis, 1969). Everyday conventions include trafﬁc rules (driving
left or right), technological standards (GSM frequencies), spelling
standards, and rules for appropriate behavior, such as dress codes
and table manners (Elias, 1969; Ullmann-Margalit, 1977; Coleman,
1990). These conventions share the feature that, once established,
none of the actors involved has an incentive to deviate from the
convention, provided that others do not deviate.
In some coordination problems, there is no reason to prefer one
conventionover another. Thedrivingproblem is a prominent exam-
ple, but the situation probably also holds for many etiquette rules
(e.g., does anyone really prefer “black tie” over “blue tie”?). In other
cases, possible conventions are ranked according to their utility for
all actors involved. For instance, we may choose between every-
one being self-sufﬁcient or everyone specializing in one type of
labor, where the latter ismore efﬁcient (provided that others do the
same). A further classiﬁcation might be made according to the con-
sequences of coordination failure. While some actions have higher
or lower payoffs if they are also chosen by others, actions may have
different consequences when they are not chosen by others. When
two people fail to coordinate in trying to lift a heavy object, the one
who does not lift is better off than the one who unsuccessfully lifts.
Still, both would have preferred to lift the object together. Similar
risks apply to many collective action problems (cf. Hardin, 1995).
Situations where it is problematic to reach socially and individu-
ally optimal conventions are central to this paper. The coordination
game in Fig. 1 represents such a situation for two actors.



















































aFig. 1. A coordination game and a numerical example.
This game has two pure Nash equilibria: (left, left) and (right,
ight). The payoffs are higher for both players if both play left;
herefore (left, left) is the payoff-dominant or efﬁcient equilib-
ium. Choosing left is also risky: if the other player plays left or
ight with equal probability, the expected payoff of playing left is
ower than the expected payoff of playing right. Therefore, (right,
ight) is the risk-dominant equilibrium (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988).
e refer to the actions associated with these two equilibria as
ayoff-dominant and risk-dominant actions. The equilibria in the
oordination game can be interpreted as conventions. Throughout
his paper, we mostly use the term “convention” to refer to these
quilibria.
Early studies onmulti-personcoordination focusonglobal inter-
ction (i.e., every actor interacts with every other actor). Such
heoretical models suggest that risk-dominant conventions are
ore likely to occur even if they are inefﬁcient (Kandori et al.,
993; Young, 1993). This assertion is mirrored in experimental
tudies that show how subjects’ behaviors often converge to risk-
ominant conventions (Cooper, 1990; VanHuyck et al., 1990).More
ecent models recognize that in larger populations, actors adjust
heir behavior not to everyone but rather to their local environ-
ent. One reason for this is that actors can only observe behavior
ithin a limited portion of the population. A more important rea-
on is that the very nature of the interaction does often not imply
lobal interaction. For example, one speaks the language spoken
y those one talks to, which is typically not the entire population.
till, Young (1998) predicts that eventually everyone will play the
isk-dominant behavior even in coordinationgamesplayed in anet-
ork structure. These results are derived froma stochasticmodel in
hich actors make random ‘mistakes.’ More deterministic models
nd that the network matters for the likelihood of reaching payoff-
ominant behavior (Berninghaus and Schwalbe, 1996; Berninghaus
nd Ehrhardt, 1998; Buskens and Snijders, 2008).
Although explicit theoretical models of coordination in net-
orks are scarce, the topic is not: a large strand of sociological
iterature studies processes of social inﬂuence in networks (see
arsdenandFriedkin, 1993, for anoverview).Aclosely relatedbody
f literature exists on threshold models of diffusion (Granovetter,
978), including a number of studies looking at network effects on
iffusion (AbrahamsonandRosenkopf, 1997;Watts, 1999; Ehrhardt
t al., 2006; Centola and Macy, 2007). The network coordination
ame applied in this paper may be interpreted as a game-theoretic
epresentation of social inﬂuence or diffusion.
All of these studies consider networks to be exogenous. It is
ncreasingly recognized, however, that the commonly observed
elation between networks and behavioral similarity can be
ttributed not only to inﬂuence, but also to selection. Actors prefer
o interact with others who have similar characteristics or behave
imilarly (McPherson et al., 2001). This implies that social net-
orks also change in the feedback process between inﬂuence and
election (Snijders, 2001; Knecht, 2008). Behavioral dynamics can
e expected to differ when networks are dynamic. For instance,
ifferences in behavior are more likely to persist if groups that
se different conventions self-segregate. This paper contributes to
better understanding of such co-evolution processes. Thus, theetworks 32 (2010) 4–15 5
main question is: how do conventions in coordination problems and
networks co-evolve?
A number of studies address theoretical perspectives on this
question. Jackson and Watts (2002) propose a game-theoretic
model in which actors play coordination games in an endogenous
network and derive conditions under which constellations of net-
works and behavior are stochastically stable depending on the cost
ofmaintaining ties. Theirmain ﬁnding is that, whereas various net-
work structures are possible, behavioral choices in the coordination
game become homogeneous. Berninghaus and Vogt (2006) analyze
a similar (though deterministic) model, and ﬁnd that networks can
emerge consisting of multiple unconnected groups, while differ-
ent conventions are maintained within various groups. (See also
Skyrms and Pemantle, 2000; Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2005, for
related models.) These studies provide general characterizations
of networks that might emerge, but many different constellations
are still usually at least theoretically possible. To examine which
stable structures aremore likely depending on various starting con-
ditions, Buskens et al. (2008) apply computer simulations. They
ﬁnd that the density of the initial network has a strong inﬂuence
on the way behavior develops: the higher the density, the stronger
the inﬂuence of the initial behavioral distribution on the behavior’s
emergent distribution. Moreover, they ﬁnd that if the initial net-
work is more segmented, then there is higher likelihood that two
groups with different behavior will emerge. More generally, it is
found that in a majority of the cases, a single convention is reached.
Our ﬁrst aim is to empirically study which outcomes of the co-
evolution process are more or less likely given initial conditions,
such as initial network structures. For this purpose, our experimen-
tal setup includes three different initial eight-person networks: the
full network, the circle network, and the “two-squares” network
(see Fig. 2). By choosing these three network structures, we vary
both network density and segmentation.
All models discussed above assume that actors are fully
informed of all other actors’ past behavior. This assumption seems
highlyunrealistic formany real-life contexts. In largepopulations, it
is typically impossible to keep trackof all others’ behavioral choices.
But even in smaller populations this might be difﬁcult if behavior
can only be discovered through interacting with or obtaining per-
sonal information about another actor. This could be the case for
both opinions and other types of behavior (e.g., choice of technol-
ogy, language). Our second aim is to examine what effect limited
information has on the co-evolution of networks and conventions.
We compare the situation in which actors observe past behavior of
all other actors in the network to the situation in which they only
observe their neighbors.
1.2. An experimental approach
Despite the growing theoretical interest in the co-evolution of
networks and behavior, empirical evidence testing these theories
is scarce. This is understandable given that the demands to data
suitable for testing these theories are very high. More speciﬁcally,
one needs detailed longitudinal information on social relations and
individual behavior. To test predictions at the network or macro
level, one needs sufﬁcient variance and many observations at the
macro level. While collecting ﬁeld data that meet these require-
ments is not impossible (e.g, Knecht, 2008), practical difﬁculties
mean that one usually must compromise on the number of obser-
vations at the network level, the number of observed time points,
or the “depth” of observation at the individual level.As an alternative, we suggest laboratory experiments. Experi-
ments have a number of well-known advantages that make them
the preferred research method for behavioral approaches: the
experimenter is in considerable control of incentive structures,
information availability, and other ingredients of game-theoretic

















































nFig. 2. Initial networ
odels that are hard to measure in real-life situations (Crawford,
997; Camerer, 2003). Moreover, behavior can be unambiguously
bserved in the laboratory. Accurate information on relations and
ehaviors can be recorded at every time-point, and one can rel-
tively easily observe multiple networks and then examine the
ffects of various conditions at the network level.
Experiments therefore allow for an explicit micro–macro per-
pective. We vary conditions at the macro level (such as initial
etwork structure and information availability), and study the
ffects of these conditions on macro-level properties (i.e., emer-
ent conventions and the network structure). Because we also
bserve all individual behavior, we can place the process “under
hemicroscope” and study how exactlymacro-level conditions lead
via individual behavior – to macro-level outcomes (cf. Coleman,
990). When the theoretical model fails to correctly predict out-
omes at the macro level, it is possible to examine which aspects
f the micro-foundations are responsible for deviations. Moreover,
nderstanding the individual level processes that drivemacro-level
rocesses’ dynamics might also help to predict which of many sta-
le states aremoreor less likely to occur. Studying thesemicro-level
rocesses is our third aim.
Adetailedexaminationatboth themicroandmacro levels isuse-
ul, given current network evolution models. These models make
peciﬁc assumptions about, for instance, individual behavior and
nformation use. In real-life settings, such model assumptions are
ard to measure, which makes it difﬁcult to assess which aspects
f a model are most empirically problematic. Experiments are use-
ul for developing and ﬁne-tuning theoretical models before they
re tested more broadly using real-life data. We do not advocate
xperiments, however, as the only way to study network evolu-
ion. Studying network evolution through experimental methods
lso has disadvantages. As always with laboratory experiments,
he external validity of ﬁndings obtained under abstract laboratory
onditions is lower than for real-life data. Another problem is that
ractical considerations usually prohibit using groups that approx-
mate group sizes considered typical in real-life human interaction.
herefore,weconsiderexperimentsasamerelyuseful intermediate
tep between developing network evolution models and “messy”
eld research on real-world phenomena.
We aim to take maximal advantage of experimental methods’
eneﬁts by explicitly making the experimental design and theoret-
cal model as similar as possible. We use computer simulations to
enerate predictions tailor-made to our experimental conditions.
n this way, we hope to minimize the misﬁt between the model
nd experimental conditions, and thereby obtain strong tests of our
ypotheses. Corbae and Duffy (2008) conducted one other experi-
ent on coordination games in dynamic 4-person networks. They
nd that, in the presence of shocks, only networks consisting of
airs are stable. By comparison, we use 8-person networks and
ocus on the efﬁciency of emerging behavior, the inﬂuence of initial
etwork structures, and information availability.d in the experiment.
Our study reﬂects the micro–macro approach sketched above.
First, we specify a formal model of the co-evolution of coordina-
tion and networks taking into account the arguments for limited
information availability. We analytically characterize this model’s
stable (macro-)states. Second,we conduct computer simulations to
generate more precise macro-level predictions of the experimental
conditions. We formulate hypotheses at both the micro and macro
levels. Third, we report the results of an experiment that tests our
hypotheses.
2. Model and simulation
2.1. The model
First, we deﬁne the underlying game: a coordination game
played in a network. Actors interact if there exists a tie between
them. The actorswithwhom an actor interacts are called neighbors.
Actors play a repeated multi-person coordination game as shown
in Fig. 1 with their neighbors, choosing only one of two actions
against all neighbors. In each period, they receive payoffs from all
interactions with their neighbors.
We assume that actors update their actions according to myopic
best-reply behavior (cf. Kandori et al., 1993); that is, they optimize
their payoff in the current period, assuming that the other actors
act as they did in the previous period. When actors are indifferent
between two actions, they do not change their behavior. It is easy to
verify that actors play the payoff-dominant action (left) if and only
if the proportion of neighbors playing left is at least (a − b)/(a −
b − c + d). We refer to this quantity as the risk threshold.
Maintaining ties is costly. In each period, actors pay for each
tie. In real life, people face constraints on time and effort in the
maintenance of social relationships. In related models, this is often
translated into the assumption that there is a ﬁxed upper limit to
the number of ties one can maintain. We generalize this assump-
tion using a convex cost function, such that the marginal tie cost
increases with the number of ties. Speciﬁcally, the cost of t ties in
period p to actor i is given by k(t)ip = ˛kip + ˇk2ip, with˛ = 6 andˇ =
1. An alternative interpretation is that interactions have decreas-
ing marginal returns: the net beneﬁts of interactions decrease with
every additional relation.
We introducenetworkdynamics through the following assump-
tions. In every period, all actors can propose one new tie to another
actor, or they can removeoneexisting tie. Ties are createdbymutual
consent: a new relation is formed only if both parties agree to it.
Existing ties can be dissolved unilaterally. This assumption is a con-
sequence of ties representing interactions, which by nature require
the consent of bothparties involved. Actors are assumed to choose a
change in ties (if any) that yields the highest expected payoff, given
the actions of other actors in the previous period. If several changes
yield the same payoff, a random choice is made between them.














































thepayoffs in thegames, actorsplaying left canproﬁtablymaintain,
atmost, seven ties (with other actors also playing left),while actors
playing right can proﬁtably maintain, at most, ﬁve ties (with other
actors also playing right).R. Corten, V. Buskens / So
escribed above runs in three phases per period:
1) Each actor initiates at most one change in ties. Either a new tie
is proposed, an existing tie is severed, or nothing is changed.
Bilateral proposals immediately result in ties, and removals are
immediately implemented.
2) Actors choose to accept or reject incoming (unilateral) propos-
als from phase 1.
3) Actors choose an action in the multi-person coordination game
in the network that results from phases 1 and 2. They receive
their payoffs for this period.
While earlier models assumed that actors observed the behav-
or of all actors in the network, we introduce limited information.
e assume that the extent to which actors observe others’ behav-
or in the previous period depends on the network. We study two
nformation regimes:1
1) Local information: actors only observe the behavior of their
neighbors;
2) Global information: actors observe the behavior of all actors.
The information on behavior by actors other than neighbors is
elevant only when actors make decisions about creating new ties.
hen actors update their behavior, they react only to their neigh-
ors, so informationaboutotheractorsdoesnotplaya role. Severing
ies obviously only occurs between neighbors, so the distinction
etween the two information regimes is also irrelevant for this sit-
ation. Because network structure beyond direct adjacency does
ot enter into actors’ considerations, other informational assump-
ions, e.g., what actors know about the network structure, does not
ffect our predictions.
We need one additional assumption tomodel how actors decide
hen choosing new neighbors if they only have information on
heir neighbors’ behavior. We assume that actors use their neigh-
ors’ behavior to predict the behavior of others who they do not
bserve. If a proportion p of those that they observe (neighbors plus
hemselves) play action Y, they will assume that anyone else plays
with probability p. Given this probability p, an actor proposes a
ie to someone they cannot observe only if the expected beneﬁts
re larger than the tie costs.
.2. Analytic results
We deﬁne a constellation of network ties and behavior as stable
f two conditions are satisﬁed. First, no actor has an incentive to
hange his or her behavior, given the behavior of neighbors. Second,
he network is pairwise stable, as deﬁned by Jackson and Wolinsky
1996): no actor has an incentive to sever a tie, and no tie can be
dded without the consent of both parties.
Stable states can be formally characterized using the following
eﬁnitions and theorems:
eﬁnition 1. A (sub)network is t-full if and only if none of the
ctors have more than t ties and either (a) the addition of a tie
auses at least one actor to have more than t ties, or (b) no ties can
e added to the (sub)network.
eﬁnition 2. t¯z is the maximum number of ties an actor wants to
ave if she chooses action Z, where Z ∈ {l(eft), r(ight)}.
1 These two extreme scenarios are special cases of a more general model in which
n actor can observe neighbors only at a speciﬁc distance. Additional simulation
esults on intermediate cases did not imply new substantive hypotheses that were
nteresting for further experimental testing.etworks 32 (2010) 4–15 7
Theorem 1. Consider the co-evolution process as speciﬁed above.
Assume that tie costs are equal to k(t) = ˛t + ˇt2, where ˛ > b and
ˇ > 0.Under global information, networks are stable if and only if they
satisfy one of the following conditions:
(1) All actors choose the same action Z, where Z ∈ {L, R}, and the net-
work is t¯Z-full.
(2) Thenetwork consists of two subnetworks of actors playing left and
right, and these subnetworks are t¯L-full and t¯R-full, respectively,
and there are no ties between the two subnetworks.
Theorem 2. Consider the co-evolution process as speciﬁed above.
Assume that tie costs are equal to k(t) = ˛t + ˇt2, where ˛ > b and
ˇ > 0. Under local information, networks are stable if and only if they
satisfy one of the following conditions:
(1) All actors choose the same action Z, where Z ∈ {L, R}, and the net-
work is t¯Z-full.
(2) Thenetwork consists of two subnetworks of actors playing left and
right, and these subnetworks are t¯L-full and t¯R-full, respectively.
There are no ties between the two subnetworks, and for at most
one action Z ∈ L, R, there exists an actor who chooses Z and has
less than tZ ties.
Theorem 1 states that, in any stable state, the network consists
of one or more such subnetworks, within which all actors play the
same action. The number of tieswithin each component is themax-
imum that the actors can afford given the payoffs to their actions
and the tie costs.Within these boundaries, however,many different
constellations are possible, such as only one component in which a
single convention is played, several components playing the same
convention, or several components playing different conventions
(cf. Jackson and Watts, 2002. For the proof of Theorem 1, we refer
to Buskens et al. (2008).
Under local information, our decision rule implies that actors in
a homogeneous component guess that actors in other components
alsobehave the sameas themselves. The reason for this is that actors
only observe their own behavior in the component. Therefore, we
need the extra condition in Theorem 2. The argumentation for this
extra condition is rather obvious given that, when this condition is
not fulﬁlled, at least two actors want to establish a new tie. After
theactorsdiscover that theyplaydifferentactions, two thingsmight
happen. Either the tie is severed again, or one of the actors changes
behavior and becomes part of the other subnetwork. In the former
situation, the two actors continue to create and sever the tie.
For our experimental conditions, we characterize the general
results on stable statesmoreprecisely. Theexperiment is conducted
with groups of eight players, who play one of the two games shown
in Fig. 3. The tie costs are deﬁned as k(ti) = 6ti + t2i , such that, for
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According to Theorem1, thismeans that in our eight-actor setup
he following types of constellations are stable under global infor-
ation:
All players playing left, with all ties present;
All players playing right, with all players with a degree less then
ﬁve connected to one another. This may be a single component
with all players having ﬁve ties, a single component with two
players having two ties each, and six players with ﬁve ties, or two
components: one full component of six players and a dyad.
Heterogeneous constellations in which some players play right
and others play left. In these cases, the network will consist of
two components with all ties present within the components.
Under local information, both homogeneous constellations are
till stable, but most of the heterogeneous constellations do not
ulﬁll Theorem 2. Consider the case where there are two fully con-
ected components: one component of three players playing left,
nd one of ﬁve players playing right. Because behavior within the
ubnetworks is homogeneous, these actors conclude that the actors
n the other subnetwork also play the same action, in which case
t would be proﬁtable to form ties. Thus, ties are formed. Subse-
uently, depending on the speciﬁc payoffs in the game, left-players
ight switch to right. Alternatively, the tie is severed again in the
ext period. As a result, the only heterogeneous stable constella-
ions under local information consist of six right-players in a full
omponent and a dyad of left-players.
.3. Simulation
Given the characterization of possible stable states in our exper-
mental conditions, an open question is which of these stable states
re more or less likely to arise given speciﬁc initial conditions. To
erive such predictions, we perform computer simulations of our
odel with experimental conditions as parameters. The aim of the
imulations is to derive sharp predictions for this parameter space,
ather than explore the behavior of the model under many condi-
ions (see Buskens et al., 2008, for a broader investigation).
We study the following conditions:
Two payoff sets for the coordination game as shown in Fig. 3
that only vary in the risk involved in playing left. Because the
risk is lower in Game I than in Game II, we label them “low risk”
and “high risk,” respectively; in both games, playing right is risk-
dominant.
Two information regimes as described above, in which actors can
either observe the actions of all other actors or their neighbors’
actions only.
Three initial networks with eight actors: the full network, the
circle network, and the two-squares network (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 4. Average efﬁciency by risk level, initial networketworks 32 (2010) 4–15
• The propensity to play left in the ﬁrst period, using 2/8, 3/8, 4/8,
5/8, and 6/8.
The combination of these parameters leads to 60 different com-
binations. We simulate the network formation process until we
obtain a stable situation for each of these combinations, and repeat
theprocess 400 times. Altogether, this results in a simulateddataset
of 24,000 cases.
Onaverage, it took40.37 tie changesand2.65behavioral changes
to reach a stable state. Of all the simulations, 76.5% converged
to a homogeneous constellation in which all actors played the
same action in the coordination game. In the remaining 23.5%,
heterogeneous constellations emerged. We deﬁne efﬁciency as the
proportion of actors in the network playing the payoff-dominant
action left. Average efﬁciency over all simulation runs was .31.
Overall, most situations converged to a homogeneous inefﬁcient
convention, and both efﬁcient homogeneous outcomes and het-
erogeneous outcomes occurred less frequently.
For a more detailed examination of our results, we examined
average efﬁciency levels and heterogeneity in stable states per infor-
mation regime and initial network, separately for the two risk
levels. To quantify the extent of heterogeneity, let L indicate the
proportion of actors playing left. Heterogeneity is deﬁned as h =
4L(1 − L). Themeasurevariesbetween0and1, andequals1when
L is exactly 1/2 (indicating maximal heterogeneity), and equals 0
when L is either 0 or 1 (indicating homogeneity). The results are
shown in Figs. 4 and 5.
The amount of risk involved in playing lefthas a strong effect on
the resulting efﬁciency in stable states: efﬁciency is clearly lower
when risk is higher (on average, the difference is .19). Effects of
the initial network are clearly visible only under the high-risk con-
dition, where efﬁciency appears to be lowest when starting from
the two-squares network and highest when starting from the full
network. These differences, however, are small. Effects of the infor-
mation regime are virtually absent, except under the initial circle
networkwithhigh risk,where efﬁciency is clearly lower under local
information than under global information.
Heterogeneity is lower if risk is higher (−.21 on average). Thus, if
we combine this ﬁnding with the results on efﬁciency in the previ-
ous paragraph, it appears that the higher efﬁciency in the low-risk
condition is largely caused by more heterogeneous cases (rather
than homogeneous efﬁcient cases). We can also see an effect of the
initial network. Especially in the low-risk condition, heterogene-
ity appears to be lower when starting with a full network. In the
high-risk condition, this difference is also present, but only under
global information. Unlike efﬁciency, heterogeneity clearly differs
between the two information regimes. In all cases, except with
the full initial network, heterogeneity is lower under local infor-
mation. This seems somewhat counter-intuitive. The explanation
is that with more information, it is easier to avoid actors who play a
, and information regime (simulation results).








































2Fig. 5. Average heterogeneity by risk level, initial
ifferent action. This is also consistent with the analytic result that
ost heterogeneous stable states under global information become
nstable under local information.
Buskens et al. (2008), who analyze a similar model, report a
trong effect of the initial behavioral distribution, as well as inter-
ction effects of other parameters with this initial distribution. We
xamine this issue by running regression analyses with efﬁciency
n the stable state as the dependent variable, and the initial pro-
ortion of actors playing left(pleft) and the density of the initial
etwork (full) as independent variables. Because we look at only
hree different types of initial networks, density is, in practice, a
ummy variable. As we are interested in the effect of initial density
n the effect of the initial behavioral distribution, we also include
n interaction effect between the two.
To estimate the effects of the independent variables on the pro-
ortion of actors playing left, we treat each case (i.e., a group of
ight actors) as a number of successes (actors playing left), and
pply logistic regression to predict the likelihood of success at the
ctor level. Because this approach inﬂates the number of observa-
ions, standard errors are adjusted accordingly.2 We conduct the
nalysis for the two risk levels and the two information regimes
eparately (Table 1).
In both information regimes, the initial behavioral distribution
as a very strong effect on efﬁciency. The main effect of the ini-
ial network’s density (referring to the effect of density when the
nitial distribution of behavior is .5) is small and negative. There is
lso a rather strong positive interaction effect between density and
he initial behavioral distribution. This means that the effect of the
nitial behavioral distribution is especially strong when the initial
etwork is full, and smaller when the initial network is sparse. So,
f networks are initially dense, having a majority perform a certain
ction leads to a stronger “pull” on the rest of the population.
.4. Overview of micro- and macro-level hypotheses
To conclude the theoretical portion of the analysis, we formu-
ate the micro- and macro-level hypotheses that we will test. The
icro-level hypotheses refer to the individual actor’s behavior, as
ssumed in the model. The macro-level hypotheses are based on
he simulation results.
The ﬁrst micro-level hypothesis describes how actors decide
n their actions when playing the coordination game. The model
ssumes that actors play according to a best-reply logic: they
dapt their behavior to what their current neighbors played dur-
ng the previous period. As stated in Section 2.1, actors only play
2 To estimate this model, we use the “blogit” procedure in Stata 9 (StataCorp,
005).rk, and information regime (simulation results).
the payoff-dominant action left if the proportion of their neigh-
bors also playing left is at least as large as the risk threshold. These
assumptions translate directly into the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.1. Actors play left if and only if the proportion of
their neighbors who played left in the previous period exceeds the
risk threshold.
The next twomicro-level hypotheses relate to howactors decide
to create or delete ties in the network. In the experiment, tie costs
are chosen such that the cost of a tie between two actors playing
different actions is always larger than the payoff. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.2. Actors sever ties with neighbors who played an
action different from their own in the previous period.
Hypothesis 1.2 applies to both global and local information,
because when deleting a tie, actors are already aware of a speciﬁc
actor’s previous behavior. When creating new ties, the situation
is different. Actors can only observe the behavior of potential
neighbors under global information, leading to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1.3. Under global information, actors create new ties
with other actors who played the same action as their own action
in the previous period.
Under local information, actors cannot observe the behavior of
potential neighbors, and are assumed to “guess” this behavior using
the average behavior of their current neighbors. Given that actors
only want to create ties with actors who they expect to play the
sameaction as themselves (see above), this implies that, under local
information, an actor only wants to create a tie with an unobserved
other actor if enoughof her current neighbors alsoplay “her” action.
We could specify an exact proportion of neighbors who must play
the same action for that actor to be willing to establish a new tie
with an unobserved other actor. Instead, we formulate an implica-
tion of this assumption in more general terms, and only predict the
direction of the neighbors’ behaviors’ effect on the likelihood that
new ties will be formed.
Hypothesis 1.4. Under local information, the higher the propor-
tion of an actor’s neighbors who play the same action as this actor,
the higher the likelihood that the actor proposes a new tie.
The macro-level hypotheses are based on the results of the sim-
ulation. The ﬁrst macro-level hypothesis concerns the effect of risk
on efﬁciency, and follows from Fig. 4 and Table 1.
Hypothesis 2.1. Thehigher the risk involved inplaying an efﬁcient
action, the lower the efﬁciency in stable states.
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Table 1
Logistic regression for grouped data on efﬁciency, per information regime and risk level (simulation results).
Low risk High risk
Information regime
Local Global Local Global
Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e. Coeff. S.e.
pleft 11.30 0.16 10.65 0.14 17.64 0.56 12.74 0.27
full −0.36 0.08 −0.71 0.08 −2.61 0.37 −3.39 0.32








































wonstant −6.79 0.10 −6.04
umber of groups 6000 6
og pseudolikelihood −13,461.51 −14
cFadden’s pseudo R2 0.58 0
A second set of hypotheses about the effects of the initial net-
ork and information regime on efﬁciency follows from Fig. 4 and
able 1.
ypothesis 2.2. The higher the initial efﬁciency, the higher the
fﬁciency in stable states.
ypothesis 2.3. Thehigher the initial network’s density, the lower
he efﬁciency in stable states.
ypothesis 2.4. The higher the initial network’s density, the
tronger the effect of the initial behavioral distribution on the
merging distribution of behavior.
Lastly, we derive a set of hypotheses that are concerned with
ffects on heterogeneity following from the results on heterogene-
ty in Fig. 5.
ypothesis 2.5. Higher initial network density leads to lower het-
rogeneity in stable states.
ypothesis 2.6. In initially sparse networks, more information
eads to higher heterogeneity in stable states.
. Experimental design
We test these hypotheses in a computer-aided experiment,
esigned to reﬂect both the assumptions of the theoretical model
nd its implementation in the simulation model as closely as pos-
ible. Subjects played the repeated coordination games used in the
imulation, choosing one strategy with all neighbors, while also
aving the opportunity to choose with whom they interacted. The
xperimental conditions included the three initial networks used
n the simulation (see Fig. 2), the two information regimes, and the
wo risk levels. The games used in the experiment are shown in
ig. 3. Groups of eight subjects played one of the games for 15 sub-
equent periods. In each period, they faced the following decisions
in this order):
1) Decidewhether to changeone relation: that is, proposeonenew
link to another subject or unilaterally sever one existing link;
2) Decide whether to accept incoming proposals from other sub-
jects;
3) Choose their behavior (left or right).
Because subjects could also accept incoming proposals, more
han one tie per subject may change in a given period. This setup is
dentical to the procedure used in the simulation. Only in the ﬁrst
eriod could subjects not change their network, because this was
mposed as an experimental condition.
As in the simulation, the cost function for tieswask(ti) = 6ti + t2i ,
ith ti the number of ties for subject i. In practice, the cost function




included a table showing the total costs for each possible number
of ties.
Under global information, subjects were shown their current
neighbors at the beginning of each period, as well as group mem-
bers’ behavior in the previous period. Under local information,
subjects saw only the behavior of their neighbors from the previous
period. At the end of each period, the resulting payoffs were shown,
as were current neighbors and the behavior of either all subjects or
only neighbors (again, depending on the information regime).
Appendix A, available as an electronic supplement, provides
some translated screen-shots from the computer interface, as well
as the translation of the complete instructions. The experimentwas
in Dutch. The interface did not provide any information about the
structure of the network, besides showing who the subject’s direct
neighbors were. This means that the two-squares network and the
circle network could not be distinguished by subjects. That is, on
screen, the two-squares network and the circle network looked
exactly the same. Therefore, differences in outcomes between these
two conditions can only be due to the dynamic process. At the bot-
tom of the screen, subjects could review the complete history of
their interactions. In this way, we meant to reduce unobserved
differences between subjects in their ability to memorize previ-
ous events. No communication between subjects was allowed. The
experiment was programmed and conducted with z-Tree software
(Fischbacher, 2007). After the experiment, subjectswere paid D0.01
for every point earned during the experiment. All sessions took
place at the Experimental Laboratory for Sociology and Economics
(ELSE) at Utrecht University.
Subjects were recruited from amongst undergraduate students
at Utrecht University using the internet recruitment system ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). Using this system, we recruited subjects year-
round and then invited them for experiments as needed.
For each session, 16 subjects were invited. Subjects were ran-
domly assigned toworkstations, and received instructions onpaper
after a short verbal introduction. After reading the instructions, the
subjects played three practice periods, inwhich they played against
simulated subjects instead of against one another. This facet was
explicitly communicated. During the entire experiment, subjects
were never deceived and were always allowed to ask for assistance
from the experimenters (which happened rarely).
After the practice periods, the subjects played the experimental
game for 15 periods in two groups of eight. After these 15 periods,
the subjects were re-matched into two different groups of eight,
and again played the game for 15 periods (though under a different
condition). The new condition always involved a different initial
network, a different information regime, and the same payoffs.4. Results
Weﬁrst present some generalmacro-level results, and then pro-
ceed to test themacro-level hypotheses (Section 4.1). In Section 4.2,

























EFig. 6. Average proportion left-choices in six conditions.
e test the micro-level hypotheses on individual decisions in the
oordination game. In Section 4.3, we test the micro-level hypothe-
es on linking decisions.
.1. Macro-level results
The experiment involved12 sessionswith 192 subjects, over 90%
fwhomwere students,mostly freshmen. Students came fromover
0 different ﬁelds, the most numerous of these being sociology,
conomics, and psychology. Out of all subjects, 61% were female
nd the average age was 22.1 years. Each session took about 75min
o complete. Subjects earned D12.30 on average. Because subjects
layed under two conditions,wehad a total of 48 groups. One of the
essions (with two groups) did not completely run until the 15th
eriod in the second condition due to a technical problem, such that
e only have data from 46 groups for some of the analyses.
Fig. 6 presents the average proportion of people choosing left
er initial network per period for each information regime. From
his ﬁgure it is immediately clear that subjects had a tendency to
hoose left. A majority of subjects chose left in all but one con-
able 2
fﬁciency and heterogeneity per experimental condition (N = 46).
nitial network Risk level and information regime
Low risk
Local Global Total
wo squares Efﬁciency 0.97 0.75 0.90
Heterogeneity 0.11 0.50 0.24
ircle Efﬁciency 1.00 0.97 0.98
Heterogeneity 0.00 0.11 0.05
ull Efﬁciency 1.00 0.75 0.88
Heterogeneity 0.00 0.00 0.00
otal Efﬁciency 0.99 0.84 0.92
Heterogeneity 0.04 0.14 0.09
fﬁciency= efﬁciency, Heterogeneity=heterogeneity.
Fig. 7. Average efﬁciency in the last period by risk level, initialetworks 32 (2010) 4–15 11
dition from the ﬁrst period. This is largely consistent with earlier
experimental research on coordination games (cf. Straub, 1995). In
the ﬁnal period, 74% of all subjects played left. Of all groups, ﬁf-
teen converged on playing left and only four converged on playing
right. Eight of the ﬁfteen left-playing groups also reached a stable
state in tie choices; that is, they had established a full network after
15 periods. None of the right-playing groups managed to reach a
stable state in tie choices, although their behavior was stable. One
group reached a stable state with heterogeneous behavior under
global information: after 15 periods, the network consisted of a full
component of ﬁve subjects playing left, and a full component of
three subjects playing right, with no links between the two com-
ponents.A secondgroupconvergedon this constellationunder local
information, although thiswasnot stable givenmodel assumptions.
To investigate themacro-level outcomesof theco-evolutionpro-
cess, we take all observations from the 15th period. Table 2 shows
the efﬁciency and heterogeneity for each experimental condition,
and also shows totals for the three initial networks and two infor-
mation regimes. Figs. 7 and 8 present a graphical impression of
these results in a similar fashion as that for the simulation (see
Figs. 4 and 5).
To test Hypothesis 2.1, we compare the average efﬁciency
between risk levels. Clearly, efﬁciency is lower in the high-risk con-
dition (.92 vs. .67), which is signiﬁcant using a Mann–Whitney test
(p = 0.006) and supports Hypothesis 2.1.
In accordance with Hypothesis 2.3, efﬁciency is lowest for the
full initial network (rightmost column of Table 2). This difference,
however, is not signiﬁcant. Moreover, closer inspection reveals that
the difference only occurs under global information; under local
information, the difference is either zero or reversed.ysis similar to that in the simulated data (see Table 1): logistic
regression for groupeddata on thenumber of left-choices in period
15 as the dependent variable. The unit of observation in this anal-
ysis is the individual decision; standard errors are adjusted to
High risk Total
Local Global Total Local Global Total
0.66 1.00 0.83 0.81 0.92 0.86
0.30 0.00 0.15 0.20 0.17 0.19
0.41 0.81 0.61 0.70 0.89 0.80
0.45 0.47 0.46 0.23 0.29 0.26
0.63 0.53 0.58 0.81 0.64 0.73
0.25 0.33 0.29 0.13 0.16 0.14
0.56 0.78 0.67 0.78 0.81 0.79
0.33 0.27 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.20
network, and information regime (experimental results).
12 R. Corten, V. Buskens / Social Networks 32 (2010) 4–15











































MFig. 8. Average heterogeneity in the last period by risk leve
ccount for the fact that individuals are clustered in 46 groups.
o improve statistical power, we pool observations from different
onditions and analyze them simultaneously, using control vari-
bles for the various conditions. As independent variables, we use
he distribution of behavior in period 1 (pleft), a dummy variable
ndicating whether the initial network was the full network (full),
nd the interaction between the two. The main effect of the net-
ork dummy refers to the situation where efﬁciency in period 1
s .5, because this variable is centered at .5. Moreover, we include
dummy for local information (local) and a dummy for high-risk
evel (high risk). Table 3 presents the results of the analysis. There
s a strong positive effect of initial behavior on behavior in the last
eriod, which conﬁrms Hypothesis 2.2. Also, there is a smaller but
igniﬁcant negative effect of starting in the full network, which
upports Hypothesis 2.3.
There is a positive but insigniﬁcant interaction effect between
he initial proportion playing left and the full network. Hypothesis
.4 can therefore not be conﬁrmed.
Unlike in Table 2, there is no signiﬁcant effect of high risk after
ontrolling for the behavior in the ﬁrst period. This suggests that
ifferences between risk conditions in the ﬁnal period are caused
y differences in subjects’ decisions in the ﬁrst period, when they
re not yet reacting to other subjects, and not by differences in the
o-evolution process.
Table 2 shows average heterogeneity in the last period by exper-
mental condition. Hypothesis 2.5 predicts that a higher density
f the initial network leads to lower heterogeneity. Heterogene-
ty is indeed lower in the full network condition than in the other
wo conditions combined. This difference, however, is not signiﬁ-
ant using a Mann–Whitney test. Thus, Hypothesis 2.5 cannot be
upported.Hypothesis 2.6 predicted that more information leads to greater
eterogeneity, especially in low-density networks. Heterogeneity
s lower under local information in the circle network (.23 vs. .29),
ut not in the two-squares network (.20 vs. .17). Moreover, these
able 3
ogistic regression for grouped data of the proportion playing left (experimental
esults).
Coeff. S.e. p
left 8.77 2.71 0.00
ull −2.25 0.87 0.01
ull× pleft 8.81 7.07 0.21
ocal −0.76 0.61 0.22
igh risk −0.32 0.71 0.67
onstant −2.38 2.32 0.30
umber of obs. 368
og pseudolikelihood −100.09
cFadden’s pseudo R2 0.46Fig. 9. Proportion of subjects playing left by proportion of their neighbors playing
left in the previous period.
differences are not signiﬁcant. Also, if we compare heterogeneity
between local and global information over all networks, there is no
signiﬁcant difference.3
4.2. Individual behavior I: decisions in the coordination game
Weanalyze individual behavior to assess the extent towhich the
model reﬂects actual decision-making by subjects. Hypothesis 1.1
states that subjects should play left only if the proportion of their
neighbors who played left in the previous period exceeds the risk
threshold. First, we plot average efﬁciency against the distribution
of neighbors’ behavior in the previous period for both risk levels
separately.Under theassumption thatpeopleexclusivelyplayabest
reply against what their neighbors did in the previous period, sub-
jects are expected to play right under low risk as long as less than
58% of their neighbors play left. Under high risk, this percentage is
73%.
Fig. 9 shows a somewhatmore complicated picture. Clearly, sub-
jects switch to left at lower proportions than the .58 and .73 thresh-
olds. Already, the proportion of left-choices increases considerably
in both cases at levels above .35. This indicates that subjects tend
to take on more risk than the simple myopic best-reply heuristic of
the model assumes. However, subjects’ behavior is strongly asso-
ciated with their neighbors’ behavior in the previous period. For
the majority of subjects, the threshold for switching lies between
3 If we use regression analysis to predict heterogeneity with multiple predictors
simultaneously, we ﬁnd the same results.
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Table 4
Logistic random intercept regression on playing left, per information condition.
Information regime
Global Local
Coeff. S.e. p Coeff. S.e. p
neigthres 1.01 0.45 0.03 −0.06 0.44 0.89
neighleft 3.78 0.67 0.00 5.98 0.77 0.00
egoleft 1.52 0.29 0.00 2.88 0.26 0.00
groupleft 2.11 0.77 0.01 – – –
high risk −0.16 0.37 0.67 −1.10 0.38 0.00
period 0.01 0.03 0.69 0.06 0.03 0.07
numties 0.06 0.08 0.49 0.07 0.08 0.37
part 0.76 0.39 0.05 0.25 0.30 0.40
Constant −4.07 0.55 0.00 −4.05 0.57 0.00

















































decision was made in the ﬁrst or second part of the experiment
(part).
Table 5 shows the results. First, the signiﬁcant negative effect of
numties reﬂects the increase in marginal tie costs as implementedar. group level 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
umber of obs. 2520 2677
og likelihood −361.25 −324.22
4 and .6. Although the payoff functions are different in both risk
onditions, subjects’ reactions to their neighbors are very similar.
Fig. 9 shows only the bivariate relation between neighbors’
ehavior and the subjects’ own behavior. To isolate the effect of
eighbors’ behavior from those of other effects, we conduct a
ogistic regression analysis with behavior as the binary dependent
ariable and subjects’ decisions in every period as the unit of obser-
ation. Because observations within and between subjects are not
ndependent, we use a model with a random intercept at the indi-
idual and the group levels. To test whether it is really the risk
hreshold that matters, we include a dummy variable indicating
hether the proportion of neighbors who played left in the pre-
ious period exceeds the threshold (neigthres), in addition to the
roportion of the subject’s neighbors playing left (neighleft) in
he previous period. According to Hypothesis 1.1, neigthres should
ave a signiﬁcant positive effect, but there should be no addi-
ional signiﬁcant effect of the proportion of neighbors playing left
neighleft). As control variables, we include a dummy variable for
igh risk (high risk), the subject’s own behavior in the previous
eriod (egoleft), and the proportion of the whole group playing
eft (groupleft). The latter variable is only included in the model
or global information, as subjects were not informed about the
ehaviorof thegroupbeyond theirownneighbors. Furthermore,we
nclude time (period), the number of ties a subject has (numties),
nd whether the decision was made in the ﬁrst part or the sec-
nd part of the experiment (part). Because this set of variables
iffers between information regimes, we estimate separate models
or each regime (Table 4).
To test Hypothesis 1.1, we compare the effects of neigthres and
eighleft. Under global information, there is a signiﬁcant positive
ffect of neigthres, as predicted: subjects are more likely to play
eft if the proportion of neighborswho played left exceeds the risk
hreshold. However, in contradiction with Hypothesis 1.1, there is
n additional effect of neighbors’ behavior (neighleft). Under local
nformation, there is only an effect of neighleft, and no signiﬁcant
ffect of the speciﬁc threshold. Thus, although these results again
how that subjects do strongly react to their neighbors’ behavior,
heir behavior does not conform exactly to the threshold effect as
redicted by Hypothesis 1.1. There is also a signiﬁcant effect of sub-
ects’ own behavior in the previous period, indicating some degree
f behavioral inertia, especially under the local information condi-
ion. Under global information, the average behavior of the group in
he previous period has a signiﬁcant positive effect. Thus, control-
ing for the behavior of neighbors in the previous period, subjects
end to go along with the rest of the group. A possible explanation
or this ﬁnding is that subjects are to some degree forward-looking;
hat is, they adapt to the behavior by non-neighbors in anticipationetworks 32 (2010) 4–15 13
of becoming neighbors themselves. Under the global information
condition, there is also aweakly signiﬁcant effect of part, indicating
that subjects were more likely to play left when they were play-
ing the second set of 15 periods, after the reshufﬂing of groups.
Nevertheless, additional analyses (not reported here), in which we
estimate the same models but use only observations from the ﬁrst
15periods (before rematching)donot showsubstantivedifferences.
These ﬁndings suggest ways in which our actor model could
be improved. One way would be to endow actors with forward-
looking capabilities. Deriving precise implications from such an
adapted model is beyond the scope of this paper (i.e., it would
require another simulation exercise as in Section 2). To specu-
late, however, we expect that if it is true that efﬁciency is higher
than expected because right-playing subjects anticipate ties with
left-playing non-neighbors, this effect is smaller under local infor-
mation (because subjects cannot observe non-neighbors). This is
consistent with the results in Table 2 showing that efﬁciency is
lower under local information.
4.3. Individual behavior II: linking decisions
Fig. 10 shows the proportion of ties created and dissolved by
information regime. The results distinguish between pairs playing
similar or dissimilar behavior. Ties between actors playing the same
action (similar pairs) are createdmore frequently than ties between
actors playing different actions (dissimilar pairs). Under local infor-
mation, this relationship is much weaker because actors have to
guess who will act similarly.4 Ties between dissimilar individuals
are more likely to be dissolved than ties between similar individ-
uals. These results are all signiﬁcant. Thus, subjects tend to sever
ties with neighbors who behave differently in either information
regime, and create ties more often with subjects who display sim-
ilar behavior as far as they can observe. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are
therefore conﬁrmed.
Fig. 10doesnot showhowsubjectsmake linkingdecisionsunder
local information. In the simulation model, we assumed that actors
use information on their neighbors’ behavior and “project” this
onto potential neighbors. To investigate whether subjects use this
heuristic, we run a random intercept logistic regression analysis of
the decision to create at least one new tie (either doing by making
or accepting a proposal). The unit of analysis is the subject-period;
the dependent variable is coded 1 if the subject created at least one
new tie during the period, and 0 otherwise. Because we are inter-
ested in the creation of new ties, we only include cases inwhich the
maximum proﬁtable number of ties (5 or 7) was not yet reached.
Moreover, to account for the interdependence of decisions within
subjects overperiods andbetween subjectswithin groups,weagain
add random intercepts at the subject level (14 periods per subject)
and the group level (eight subjects per group).
We include as independent variables the number of ties the sub-
ject already has (numties), the subject’s behavior in the previous
period (egoleft), the average behavior of the subject’s neighbors in
the previous period (neighleft), and the proportion of neighbors
acting the same as the focal subject (neighsim). We hypothesize
that the effect of neighsim is positive: the more a subject experi-
ences that his local environment acts like him- or herself. Lastly,
we add the period (period), risk level (high risk), and whether the4 The small difference still noticeable under local information might be due to
subjects avoiding other subjects with whom they just dissolved a tie: these subjects
are more likely to play dissimilar behavior.
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Fig. 10. Proportions o
Table 5
Random intercept logistic regression analysis on creating at least one new tie with
local information.
Coeff. S.e. p
egoleft 0.01 0.17 0.95
neighleft 0.05 0.25 0.84
neighsim −2.15 0.30 0.00
numties −0.39 0.05 0.00
high risk −1.02 0.27 0.00
period −0.08 0.02 0.00
part 0.48 0.22 0.03
Constant 4.87 0.67 0.00






























tar. group level 0.24 0.09
umber of obs. 1509
og likelihood −869.29
n the cost function: themore ties a subject already has, the smaller
he probability that she will form another one. Moreover, the likeli-
ood of creating a new tie decreases with period and risk. Contrary
o expectations, the effect of neighsim is negative. Subjects are less
ikely to create new ties when they are more similar to their neigh-
ors, and they thus are not using the heuristic assumed in the
imulation model. Rather, subjects seem to assume that unknown
otential neighbors are playing the alternative action. It might be
hat this unexpected effect is the result of subjects remembering
nteractions in previous periods, for which the theoretical model
oes not allow. Fig. 10 shows that subjects tend to sever ties with
eighbors playing the alternative behavior, and it might be that
fter such a deletion they conclude that these previous neigh-
ors (now invisible under local information) will persist in playing
he different behavior. This logic would result in a negative effect
f neighsim. Additional analyses show that the negative effect of
eighsim becomes stronger in later periods of the experiment. This
oes indeed suggest that subjects make use of their knowledge of
he history of play, albeit in a manner different from the manner
roposed before.
. Conclusions and discussion
We studied coordination in dynamic networks, focusing on
fﬁciencyandheterogeneityof emergentbehavior, andon the inﬂu-
nce of information availability. We speciﬁed a game-theoretic
odel and used simulation methods to generate speciﬁc predic-
ions about the effects of initial conditions and limited information
n the efﬁciency and heterogeneity of emergent behavior. We
ested micro- and macro-level hypotheses in a laboratory exper-f ties changed.
iment. Three macro-level hypotheses were conﬁrmed. First, the
behavior of subjects in the ﬁrst period determines to a large extent
their behavior in the ﬁnal period. Second, efﬁciency is lower if risk
is higher. Third, efﬁciency is lower if the network is initially denser.
For the remaining three macro-level hypotheses on the effects of
initial network structure and information availability, the results
were always in the expected direction but not signiﬁcant.
At themicro level, we found that, by and large, individual behav-
ior appears to resemble behavior as assumed in the model, at least
when information on the behavior of non-neighbors is available.
Subjects adapt their behavior to that of their neighbors in the pre-
vious period (Hypothesis 1.1). In their choices of network relations,
subjects have a clear preference for subjects who play the same
action as themselves (Hypothesis 1.3) and exclude those who play
thealternative action (Hypothesis 1.2).Moreover,manyexperimen-
tal groups managed to converge on stable constellations that were
theoretically predicted involving both efﬁcient conventions and sit-
uations in which no single convention was reached.
In some respects, the behavior of subjects also deviates from
the behavior assumed in themodel: subjectsmore easily opt for the
payoff-dominant action thanwould be expected frommyopic best-
reply behavior (Hypothesis 1.1). Moreover, if subjects are informed
on the behavior of the whole group rather than only their neigh-
bors, they are also inﬂuenced by the behavior of those who are
not their neighbors, which suggests some anticipation of future
interactions with these other subjects. For local information, it was
theorized that subjects use the average behavior of their neighbors
as a predictor for the behavior of potential neighbors (Hypothesis
1.4). However, subjects seem to use the behavior of their neighbors
as a predictor for what their neighbors are not doing. Furthermore,
we showed that this effect becomes stronger in later periods of
the experiment, which suggests that subjects use the history of
interactions in their decisions.
Before we move to broader conclusions based on the results, let
us brieﬂy discuss some limitations of the experimental design and
analyses. First, the number of groups was relatively low given the
number of experimental conditions. This is the result of a practical
trade-off between group size and the number of groups. We feel
that for network experiments to capture the notion that individuals
cannot observe or inﬂuence thenetwork as awhole (as ismostly the
case in real life), groups should be relatively large. Our experiment
is one of the few inwhich groups larger than six are used. The price,
due to practical and ﬁnancial reasons, is fewer groups. The lack of
signiﬁcant results at the group level (even though results tend to
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Second, the choice of payoffs led subjects to choose the payoff-
ominant action relatively easily, resulting in little variation in
acro-level outcomes, especially under the low-risk condition. The
esults might have been stronger if the differences between the
ayoff-dominant equilibrium and the risk-dominant equilibrium
ad been more pronounced.
The many interdependencies, especially with linking behavior,
osed signiﬁcant methodological challenges that we dealt with
nly inpart.Multinomial logistic regressionmodels for tiedecisions
ould have been used, which resemble other more sophisticated
ethods for longitudinal network data (i.e., Snijders, 2001; Snijders
t al., 2007). Considering the already rather extensive theoretical
nd empirical analyses, we chose not to introduce these further
omplexities.
Our results indicate that people are able to coordinate on
fﬁcient behavior if the interaction structure is not exogenously
etermined, but rather co-evolveswith behavioral choices.We also
ound that the initial network structure matters: if the network is
nitially denser, emerging conventions are more likely to be inefﬁ-
ient. We did not ﬁnd convincing evidence that the emergence of
onventions is very dependent on information availability.: also if
ubjects possessed only local information, they reached high efﬁ-
iency levels.
A further conclusion from our results is that the simple model
n which actors play the best reply against their neighbors’ behav-
or in the previous period is too simple to adequately capture real
ndividual behavior in situations represented by themodel.We saw
igns of both forward-looking and backward-looking behavior. This
eems to lead to a more frequent emergence of efﬁcient behavior
han theoretically predicted. The discrepancy between the model
nd the actual behavior of our subjects might be a reason for devi-
tions between predictions and observations at the macro-level as
ell, although it is not yet clear how micro-level differences affect
acro-level outcomes. Therefore, extending the existing models to
ncorporate more complex decision-making processes and derive
ew macro-level implications is a desirable direction for further
esearch.
However, one might also argue that such effects are typical
or the relatively small group sizes used in our experiment. In
ome real-life applications, where groups tend to be much larger,
oth remembering previous interactions and anticipating behav-
or in the population as a whole would be much harder. From this
erspective, our model might be judged as fairly appropriate for
odeling coordination in real networks. This is because behavior
n the individual level in the model approximates the empirical
ehavior of subjects in the experiment fairly well. It remains to be
een (in experiments with more observations on the group level or
nﬁeld applications)whether thepredictions of themodel alsohold
n the macrolevel. Moreover, a remaining challenge is to under-
tand choices in network formation when limited information is
vailable.
ppendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associatedwith this article can be found, in
he online version, at doi:10.1016/j.socnet.2009.04.002.eferences
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